Certain periods in the modern economic history of national states are obviously limited to the time when a certain model of development is used. But what is meant by a model? In a broad sense, a model is understood as a mental or conditional image of a process. In our case, the process refers to the process of economic development, and the model should explain the interdependence of the main parameters describing it. A number of dictionaries, while clarifying the concept of "economic model", draw attention to the fact that we are talking about"a simplified representation of reality, an abstract generalization". The unavoidable simplification effect is due to the inability to take into account the entire system of interrelated factors operating in reality in the model. However, if it is hardly possible to create a model that reflects the entire set of simultaneously operating relationships, then it is probably advisable to supplement one conditional model with another, in which the number of considered relationships is also limited, but they are different. Such "multi-aspect" modeling, obviously, can provide a more versatile, and therefore closer to the real world, vision of reality.

Keywords: Republic of Turkey, periodization of economic history, economic model, statism versus neoliberalism.

The approach developed in Russian Turkology to the study of periods in the economic history of republican Turkey is based on taking into account two interrelated characteristics that were considered fundamental - the system of ownership forms, more precisely, the ratio of public and private ownership in industry and infrastructure, and the specifics of regulation and development of foreign economic relations. Attention to the first characteristic was dictated by the approaches of Marxist political economy, the subject of which, along with the state of the productive forces, is the relations of production, among which the main relations of ownership of the means of production were considered. The correlation of forms of ownership was crucial in determining the current or emerging mode of production in developing countries (capitalist or socialist), so in a bipolar world, its change was tracked as the most important economic characteristic. The system of foreign economic relations was important for understanding the main directions of interaction between the national economy and the world economy in general and the prospects for the development of economic relations with the USSR in particular.

Thus, the most important place in the works of the Russian Turkologist N. G. Kireev is occupied by the study of "Turkish statism", which he defines in accordance with its scope and goals as a measure of state capitalism. N. G. Kireev opposes the "narrow understanding of statism as the construction of state-owned enterprises in industry"

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[Kireev, 1990, p. 99], including the state budget, the activities of state-owned banks, and the system of relations between the state and employees. But at the same time, he sees the budget as a "monopoly source of savings" for the expansion of the state ownership system, the establishment of state-owned banks-as a result of the failure of attempts by the private sector to settle in the production sectors, which led to the subsequent creation of state-owned enterprises in them by the efforts of state banks, and an authoritarian regime and attracting hired labor to the newly created public sector [Kireev, 1990, p. 121, 106, 115-116]. N. G. Kireev considers price regulation to be an important area of state intervention in the economy, but even here he notes that "by creating and expanding large-scale factory production, the state gradually took over the regulation of prices for all types of factory products" [Kireev, 1990, p.111].

Thus, the" multi-dimensionality " of statism in the 1930s-1940s is based on the same expansion of the institution of state, primarily industrial, property: the directions of state economic regulation considered by N. G. Kireev, on the one hand, arose on its basis, and on the other, were aimed at ensuring its functioning and development.

Not only the main content, but also the evolution of statism, according to N. G. Kireev, is primarily manifested through changes in the institution of state property. The stages of economic history identified by N. G. Kireev (stages of statism development) are essentially stages of the emergence and subsequent rethinking of the principles and scope of the use of state property in the process of economic development of the republic. The content of the first stage-the "formation of republican statism" (1930-1940) - he defines as the prevailing, sometimes even monopolistic, state participation in the creation of a new economy in industrial and infrastructure construction at the expense of budget allocations [Kireev, 2006, p.73]. Similarly, in close connection with the rapidly developing state-owned entrepreneurship, N. G. Kireev analyzes the formation of the system of foreign economic regulation: "In general, a mechanism for strict and detailed control over foreign economic relations was established, which became one of the cornerstones of republican statism, and finally, the possibility of accumulating currency and monopolizing it by the state was created. This made it possible for the latter to become the main actor in the creation of a modern industrial sector and infrastructure (here and further italics are mine - N. U.), of course, without limiting private initiative" [Kireev, 2006, p. 69].

The emergence of the main dilemma of the next period in the economic development of the Republic of Turkey - the " mixed economy "(1950s-1970s) - N. G. Kireev connects with the fact that since the late 1940s there have been statements about the need to "abandon the extremes of statism, from one-sided orientation to the public sector" [Kireev, 2006, p. 76]. He writes: "... the public sector could no longer and should not have served as a locomotive of economic development, while the largest private capital of the country was not yet able to play this role, at least in vital sectors..." [Kireev, 2006, p.80]. Thus, the main content of this stage was reduced to the search for a new balance in the ownership system between the state and the national entrepreneurial bourgeoisie. N. G. Kireev characterizes the foreign economic doctrine of these decades as a fairly successful implementation of the import substitution policy. Commenting on its content, he emphasizes that "one of the most important principles of statism in the economy remained in foreign economic regulation - the principle of protecting national industry" [Kireev, 1990, p. 159].

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Finally, the main content of the next period, which began after 1980, N. G. Kireev sees in the rejection of the statist "bias" in the Turkish concept of a mixed economy and the elimination of the state's dominance in the socio-economic life of the country that has persisted for decades. The most significant manifestation of this trend, in his opinion, was the process of privatization of state-owned enterprises, and consequently, another change in the ownership system. However, he considers the changes that have taken place insufficiently significant, stating that "the Turkish economy still remains mixed with a strong public sector" [Kireev, 2006, p.90]. That is, again, the definition of the typological characteristics of the modern national economy is given through the property system. As for the revision of the system of regulation of foreign economic relations, being aimed at expanding Turkish exports, it, according to N. G. Kireev, "contributed to the further integration of Turkey into the world capitalist system, further westernization of the Turkish economy" [Kireev, 1990, p. 272].

A similar approach to the periodization of the economic history of the Republic of Turkey can be traced in the works of the Russian Turkologist-economist E. I. Urazova. She notes that in the conditions of the world economic crisis (1929-1933), the state took over the creation of a national industry with the weakness of private entrepreneurship. She identifies the period of the 1950s as an independent one. E. I. Urazova considers its main feature to be a certain weakening of the activity of statistic measures used since the 1930s. "In the 1960s and 1970s, the economy acquired a mixed, public - private character. The state directed most of its investments to the creation of capital-intensive infrastructure and industrial enterprises of national economic significance, with long construction periods and low financial returns...". At the same time, E. I. Urazova notes that during the period under review, the position of the private sector also strengthened, the main investment direction for which was modern industries created with the involvement of foreign capital [Urazova, 2008, p. 141, 144-145]. Thus, the researcher also adheres to the approach in which the main characteristic of the economic model is the relationship between the state and the private sector, which is reflected in the ownership system in industry and infrastructure. As for foreign economic aspects, after the adoption of "protective" measures at the turn of the 1920s-1930s, "which extremely tightened foreign trade and currency regulation, the development of the Turkish economy was transferred to a closed mode, which, with minor eases introduced in the 1950s, was in effect until the early 1980s" [Urazova, 2008, p. 141].

There are certain differences in the interpretation of the two researchers ' model of economic development in Turkey after 1980. In contrast to N. G. Kireev, who believes that we are talking about a certain modification of the mixed economy model, which is quite firmly connected with the concept of statism, E. I. Urazova notes that already in the early 1980s the line was drawn under the period of development of the Turkish economy according to the statistical model, as the task was set to bring it closer to the market economies of other countries [Urazova, 2008, p. 147]. The noted differences are related to the fact that under the process of liberalization, E. I. Urazova means a rather extensive set of measures, along with a change in the institutional status of state property: expanding state support for the private sector, aimed at stimulating its participation in the creation of export-oriented industrial enterprises, curtailing state entrepreneurship, eliminating state monopolies in a number of extractive and manufacturing industries, corporatization of a number of public infrastructure facilities, preparation and implementation of the first steps to privatize public sector enterprises. Their combined scale makes it possible, in the author's opinion, to speak about the deepening of the liberalization process in Turkey.-

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in economics [Urazova, 2008, p. 151]. As for the system of foreign economic relations after 1980, both N. G. Kireev and E. I. Urazova are close in their assessment of the directions of their change. E. I. Urazova considers the main task of the last stage, which continues to this day, to expand trade and economic ties on a bilateral and multilateral basis and create favorable conditions for moving to foreign markets. markets of Turkish goods and services [Urazova, 2008, p. 147].

The considered approach to the analysis of models of economic development of the Republic of Turkey, based primarily on the study of the role of forms of ownership and changes in their ratio, is very useful from the point of view of identifying in the Turkish experience the features of catch-up development common to most developing countries. Indeed, import substitution requires both strict protectionist measures of foreign economic regulation and the development of a system of state-owned entrepreneurship in order to concentrate capital for the rapid establishment of local production of finished industrial products. On the contrary, the success of an export-oriented strategy can be ensured only through the use of mechanisms of both external competition (easing foreign trade protectionism) and internal competition (encouraging private enterprise initiative, abandoning state monopoly in industrial sectors). The general nature of these patterns is fully confirmed by the experience of Turkey.

A well-known expert in the field of economic history of the Eastern countries, S. M. Ivanov, wrote:: "Outlining the general contours of the future world order, it is probably necessary to foresee not only the globalization of economic processes, but also possible national forms of their course ...the richness of the future world, as well as the way of its self - preservation, lies in its diversity " [Ivanov, p. 292-293].

From the point of view of searching for the national specifics of Turkish economic policy, certain results are obtained by using the neoclassical (neoliberal) approach, which focuses on the mechanisms that ensure the functioning of the market economy. Based on the principle of "competition - as far as possible, planning - as far as necessary", modern neoclassicists recognize the mixed state-market nature of most of the actual existing modern economic systems. The state, firstly, contributes to the stability and growth of the market economy and only, secondly, produces some goods and services that the market economy does not produce (public goods) or produces in insufficient quantities. The solution of the first main task is provided through the use of fiscal (fiscal) and monetary policies. Consequently, the role of the state is evaluated precisely through the features of using these two instruments of state regulation.

It should be noted that some attention was paid to these two aspects of state economic policy in the national Turkological literature, in particular in the works of E. I. Urazova. But the main features of Turkey's fiscal policy, in her opinion, were determined by the specifics of the main stages of economic development of the Republic of Turkey that she highlighted. Thus, E. I. Urazova explains the emergence of budget deficits in some years of the 1930s by "subordinating the budget to the policy of statism." In the 1950s, the author attributes the growing budget difficulties to the low profitability of the public sector, tax breaks for the agricultural sector and private industrial capital. Further, E. I. Urazova notes that the implementation of large investment projects, which began in the 1960s, led to increased financial tension. Finally, since 1973, the State budget has been chronically deficient. "To the extent," writes E. I. Urazova, " how these tasks (socio-economic. - N.Y. These measures were becoming increasingly urgent in the context of maintaining a high level of military and other conventional expenditures, insufficient growth in ordinary budget revenues, and budget balance becoming less achievable"

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[Urazova, 1993, p. 99]. But such an interpretation of fiscal policy needs a more detailed explanation of the fact that the period of active statistic measures in the 1930s was marked by a policy of cyclically balanced budget, while the decrease in the intensity of state statistic efforts during the "mixed economy" was marked by an increase in budget problems and, finally, the entry into a period of chronic budget deficits.

E. I. Urazova's work also analyzes the monetary policy in the republican period. The establishment of mandatory reserve requirements in Turkey dates back to the Second World War. "For a long time," she writes, "this type of regulation served as an instrument of statism policy, both in the dominance of purely administrative methods and in the general focus on using the capabilities of the banking system, primarily its private sector, to meet the needs of the state budget and finance state - owned enterprises" [Urazova, 1993, pp. 169-170]. Another type of reserves, liquid (cash on hand and government debt obligations), became widely used in the 1960s-1970s for placing government securities in private banks "in order to attract resources to finance both current budget allocations and state investments" [Urazova, 1993, p.169-170]. Thus, monetary policy instruments are again considered by the author as closely intertwined with the main conflict of the Turkish economy, which focuses on the issue of the scale or proportions in which the state participated in the economic, primarily industrial, development of the country.

But both fiscal and monetary policies themselves can significantly affect the volume of demand, the level of inflation, the interest rate, and ultimately the rate of economic growth. Therefore, even if their effect was not taken into account when developing a theoretical sketch of the model, it should have affected the results of its use without fail. Therefore, taking into account fiscal and monetary policy as independent directions of state economic policy, which were implemented in the context of a public-private form of management (i.e., the ratio of two types of ownership ceases to be the main characteristic of the model, turning into a kind of constant), we can get a fundamentally different picture of the economic development of which also shows other turning points and borders of the main periods.

With this approach, the watershed line in the economic history of the Republic of Turkey will be 1950. Indeed, prior to 1950, the annual budget was mostly in surplus, sometimes alternating with a small deficit. The tight monetary discipline of the 1930s was only broken by the end of the decade. In particular, in July 1938, Law No. 3492 was adopted, which gave the Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey (CBTR) the authority to finance state institutions, which was followed by a sharp jump in the money supply of the Republic of Turkey (cash in circulation and deposits) (Table). During the war years, this practice was supplemented by the provision of advances to the government against collateral in gold. In the post-war years, Turkey returned to a budget surplus.

But during the entire second half of the XX - beginning of the XXI century, the budget only showed an excess of revenue four times, namely, in 1951, 1967, 1970 and 1972. The deficit, which became almost chronic, was covered by issuing CBTR. The pre-1950 perception of the main tasks of the country's Central Bank as the tasks of implementing a conservative monetary policy and ensuring price stability was replaced by the idea of the possibility of a weakening of the national currency as a very real economic scenario. In 1955, the repeal of the previously existing Law No. 6544 followed, which

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Table

Money supply growth rate, 1931-1980 (%)

Year

Annual growth rate M1

Year

Annual growth rate M1

Year

Annual growth rate M1

Year

Annual growth rate M1

Year

Annual growth rate M1

Year

Annual growth rate of M2*

1931

0.6

1940

1946

6.0

1951

17.8

1963

1971

28.2

1932

-1.8

1941

1947

-8.9

1952

9.6

1964

1972

25.1

1933

-8.4

1942

1948

4.9

1953

16.4

1965

1973

27.4

1934

1.3

1943

1949

-13.8

1954

3.1

1966

1974

25.3

1935

5.2

1944

1950

7.3

1955

31.5

1967

1975

29.4

1936

7.4

1945

1956

29.1

1968

1976

23.5

1937

7.4

1957

26.6

1969

1977

34.4

1938

1.6

1958

11.3

1970

1978

34.6

1939

34.0

1959

8.8

1979

60.9

1960

1980

67.0

Average annual growth rate (M1)

4.75

25.0

-1.3

24.7

13.5

34.9

* M1 plus term deposits.

Compiled from: [Turkish Financial History..., 1999, s. 139, 254, 290.]

limited the growth of the Central Bank of Turkey's advances to the Treasury to the growth of the CBTR's assets, including reserves. From now on, the Treasury could count on the amount of funding from the Central Bank in the amount of up to 15% of current budget expenditures. In the period from 1960 to 1963, the amount of advances was reduced to 5%, but in 1970 it was raised again to 15%. Thus, Turkish researchers see the main difference between the period that began after 1950 in the fact that the Central Bank began to be considered as a source of providing unsecured loans to the government and other state organizations (see, for example, [Bakir, s. 45]). At the same time, the new law on CBTR, adopted in 1970, did not even provide for strict deadlines and a clearly defined form of their repayment. "The central bank and its monetary policy are at the mercy of the Treasury and the government's fiscal policy,"he said. Bakir [Bakir, s. 46].

The sharp turn in the country's monetary policy after 1950 is confirmed by a significant increase in the growth rate of the money supply (Table). Indeed, the periods of the 1930s and post-war years (low growth rates of the money supply)are similar in terms of their rate characteristics1, as well as the decades of the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s (noticeably, and often multiple times, increased rates of money supply growth).

The growth rate of the money supply, which significantly exceeded the rate of economic growth, led to another stable feature of economic development in the second half of the XX century - inflation.

1 The years of World War II, as a period of extraordinary economic measures, probably cannot be considered as indicating a fundamental change in macroeconomic approaches, especially since in the post-war years there was a return to a conservative monetary policy.

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Chart

Changes in the nature of fiscal and monetary policies occurred at a time when the saving capacity of the Turkish economy remained at a rather low level. Consequently, the increase in government spending could not be limited to changes in the nature of monetary policy; it almost inevitably meant a reorientation towards more active attraction of external sources of financing. As a result, in the post-war years there was a steady absolute growth of external debt, accompanied, as a rule, by an increase in the relative size of debt: from $ 373 million in 1950. (7% of GNP) it grew to $ 990 million (13% of GNP) by 1960, then to $ 1,900 billion (10.3% of GNP) by 1970. The country's external debt, which was $ 16.2 billion (23% of GNP) at the beginning of economic liberalization (1980), reached $ 276.8 billion (37.2%) as of 2008 (Calculated from: [Economic and Social Indicators (1950-2003), Table 1.1 and Table 3.11; Ekonomik Rapor2008, s. 169-170].

Thus, we can distinguish at least three important characteristics of the new period in Turkey's economic development that began in 1950, which, with a few exceptions, usually took place during the years of the military rule and (or) the active implementation of stabilization programs agreed with the IMF, covered almost the entire second half of the 20th century: 1) expansionary fiscal policy. policy, 2) expansionary monetary policy, 3) growth of external debt against the background of more active attraction of external sources of financing.

It should be noted that N. G. Kireev does not consider the 1950s as a period when any significant renewal of economic policy took place. On the contrary, noting the absence of noticeable changes in the ownership system (we are talking about the attempts to privatize state property announced by the government of the Democratic Party (DP), but which did not take place in practice), he agrees with the assessment of the Turkish author S. S. Aydemir, who, considering the economic policy of the 1950s, wrote: "...there was no difference between the economic structure of the period of the Democratic Party's rule and the previous structure. Both periods, from the point of view of fundamental principles, represented the structure of a "mixed economy" with an orientation towards capitalism... " [Kireev, 1990, p. 130]. Thus, we once again emphasize the importance of the point of view when describing the model of economic development, i.e. those aspects of economic policy that are considered to be the main ones in the analysis.

Since the above-mentioned dramatic changes in fiscal and monetary policy occurred during the years when the period of so-called active statism passed, it is probably impossible to explain them only by increasing the scale of state entrepreneurship. But then what is the reason?

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The coincidence of the boundaries of the proposed periods in the economic development of the Republic of Turkey with the transition from the autocratic regime of the first decades to the generally democratic structure of the second half of the XX century, apparently, requires going beyond the range of factors traditionally considered economic. We are talking about using the approaches of institutional economics, more precisely, the approaches of neo-institutionalism. "The credo of classical institutionalism was to recognize the individual in all its historical reality as the main element of the economic system. Modern institutionalism also introduces a structural subject-the institution. The prerequisite for such a significant change was the differentiation of cultural factors in the formation of institutions with a tendency to tradition, custom and legal, socio-political factors that imply the opposite active influence of the state and related institutions on the individual" [Evstigneeva L., Evstigneev R., 1998, p.97]. So, in the further analysis of the course of economic development, the concept of an institution is supposed to be used, which in the context of this work primarily implies the general nature of relations established between the government and the voter.

Indeed, Turkey's transition to a multi-party system in the post-war period was crucial in shifting the main emphasis in its economic policy. The abolition of the power monopoly of the Republican People's Party (CHP), which has ruled continuously since the founding of the republic, is usually regarded by researchers as the most important qualitative shift in the political system, which marked the beginning of the development of real democracy in the country.

From the point of view of economic policy, the fundamental innovation was that after the end of the period of mobilization development of the economy under the authoritarian rule of the ILP, in the context of the rapid growth of the number of parties and the aggravation of inter-party struggle, those who sought the position of the ruling parties were doomed to form their economic policies largely as populist, the most important electoral groups. The inevitability of this orientation was determined by the fact that the state continued to play a central role in shaping economic and social relations. The populist element in economic policy was particularly strong during periods of political instability, which required governments to respond immediately to the needs of the electorate.

As noted by the Turkish economist Z. Onish, the transition to parliamentary democracy in the 1950s, which took place in conditions of extreme inequality in the distribution of income, meant that the state came under pressure from populism, born out of hopes for a process of secondary redistribution. The result of this constant pressure exerted on the state, according to Onis, was the formation of the so-called low-power welfare state [Onis, 1996, p. 169]. The fact that this feature of development is really specific for Turkey is confirmed, for example, by the assessments of the results of the last decades of socio-economic development of South Korea, about which domestic researchers L. A. Anosova and G. S. Matveeva wrote that its model has not yet acquired the features of a socially oriented model, and its success was largely based on such traditional approaches. values and institutions, such as discipline and self-discipline, paternalism, shared responsibility, and loyalty to the employer. As a result of such specifics in the development of South Korean society, the comparative late formation and especially the activation of the labor movement, as well as a harsh reaction to the demands of workers by the authorities, became a consequence [Anosova and Matveeva, 1993, p. 25, 45-46]. In contrast, in Turkey, pressure is exerted on the authorities over the issue of Z.'s salary. Onish considered as "an important factor in the macroeconomic arena", due to the presence of an institutional structure, in particular

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within the framework of which, at least in the state sector of the economy, there was a de facto dominance of trade unions [Onis, 1995, p. 117-118].

In 1950, power in Turkey passed to the government formed by the DP. Democrats appreciated the chance that fell to their lot: in their economic policy, they tried to take into account the expectations and hopes of voters as much as possible. To this end, they sought to contrast their course as much as possible with the most exhausting, from the point of view of the average Turk, and which caused him deep irritation, areas of economic activity of their predecessors. It was a question of strict import restrictions, forgetting the problems of agriculture while shifting the emphasis to statistical industrialization, very moderate economic growth rates and their weak impact on improving the standard of living of ordinary people.

Therefore, "while the previous government preferred order and stability, the Democrats, recognizing their importance, directed their energy to ensuring economic growth and progress" [Singer, 1977, p. 181]. What mechanisms were used for this? They did not go beyond the usual practice of stimulating fiscal policy - the policy of increasing budget expenditures in order to expand domestic market demand and further increase production volumes.

Government spending grew by 58% (in real terms) from 1950 to 1960, significantly outpacing revenue growth. The expansionary fiscal policy of the government, not supported by the growth of tax revenues, caused an imbalance in the state budget of Turkey. To finance the economic policy of the Government, the issuing capacity of the Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey was actively used. Analyzing the situation with the use of CBTR loans, M. Singer wrote: "It is not Democrats who discovered that central bank loans can be used to achieve their political goals, but they spared no effort to attract them" [Singer, 1977, p. 348]. As a result, the country's economy faced a new problem of inflation in the 1950s: if in the period from 1946 to 1952, the average annual price increase was 2.2%, then in the period from 1953 to 1959 - almost 17% [From the Foundation of Republic..., 1999, p. 245]. The Democratic Party Government did not try to deny that its economic policies had led to inflation. Finance Minister N. Okmen commented on the situation in his speech on the draft budget for 1955 as follows:" It is true that the amount of money in circulation has increased during the period of our government, but at the same time it is impossible to deny the fact that the country's productive potential has increased many times " [From the Foundation of Republic ..., 1999, p. 245].

Much of the excess government spending was financed from outside sources. Their widespread use has also become one of the principles of the Democrats ' economic policy. A member of the government, F. Köprülu, said in an interview with Agence France-Presse: "... we will attract foreign capital to our country. If we depend only on our own resources, we will have to wait many years before we reach higher standards of living" [From the Foundation of Republic ..., 1999, p. 242].

But the optimistic government did not realize the gravity of the situation. In the country, the signs of an approaching currency and financial crisis were more clearly marked. The worsening debt problem and the incessant rise in prices forced the Democratic government to accept, in exchange for financial support from the West, a stabilization program that went down in history as the August 1958 Program.In 1960, a military coup took place in the country, ending the DP's ten-year rule.

Summing up the results of the economic policy of the government of the Democratic Party, M. Singer wrote: "The Democrats pursued an economic policy that favored-

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promoting economic growth at the expense of price stability - a choice for which they can hardly be blamed. But the nature of this policy should be defined as unrestrained... The inevitable consequence was severe inflation, which not only threatened the political popularity of the Democrats, achieved at such a high price, but also hindered economic growth" [Singer, 1977, p. 380-381].

It should be emphasized once again that the manifestations of populism in the country's economic policy intensified during periods of unstable development associated with unfavorable conditions, internal or external. Accordingly, the need for it weakened during periods favorable for the economic development of Turkey, such as, for example, the period of the 1960s-early 1970s.In 1965, the era of S. Demirel's long-term tenure as Prime Minister began. It is significant that three times during this period the budget was deficient, despite the fact that in the entire half of the XX century there were only four such cases. Accordingly, the average annual growth rate of the money supply decreased, and the inflationary background of economic development became less pronounced (Table and graph.Streamlining of public finances was largely achieved due to the transition to planned economic development, which at the same time allowed us to control the scale of attracting external sources of financing. This was also facilitated by the fact that during this period, Turkey began to actively receive currency transfers from Turkish citizens who, since the beginning of the 1960s, began to travel to Western European countries for work. The volume of these revenues, which reached $ 1 billion in a short time, was comparable to export revenues.

But later, in the mid-to late 1970s, the populist economic tradition initiated by the DP government was actively continued. The rise in oil prices has led to a sharp deterioration in the terms of foreign trade for Turkey. The system of state regulation of pricing in Turkey, among others, was based on the Oil Law of 1954, which allowed for the possibility of paying oil companies the difference between the price on the domestic market and world prices. Therefore, a sharp increase in world oil prices led to only a slight increase in the Turkish market. Often successive governments, which were completely unsure of their future, tried at all costs to avoid making an unpopular decision to increase domestic prices for petroleum products. Therefore, the continued subsidization of prices in Turkey caused a sharp increase in its consumption from 10.8 million tons in 1972 to 17.7 million tons in 1977 [Kazgan, 2002, p. 104].

The growing foreign trade deficit against the background of increased oil imports led to an increase in the country's need to attract external financial resources, which coincided with the expansion of their supply on the part of the international financial market. As a result, in 1975-1977, the average economic growth rate was high - 7%, but they indicated not so much economic prosperity as dangerous overheating of the economy. Thus, Turkish economic history has once again confirmed the largely unavoidable commitment of current governments to economic populism, which in the eyes of a significant part of society continued to be the most anticipated form of response to the expectations placed on the state.

Meanwhile, the Turkish economy was growing in an alarming way: from 1973 to 1980, the external debt increased 4.6 times, reaching $ 15.3 billion. dol. In 1978, Turkey was supposed to make debt payments in the amount of 4.84 billion dollars. But the expected foreign exchange earnings - exports and remittances from Turks working abroad-were expected to be no more than $ 3 billion. [Kazgan, 2002, s. 113]. The inevitability of a debt crisis has become clear, including to Turkey's creditors.

The country's difficult currency situation necessitated the development of stabilization measures. Since 1978, the IMF has been involved in this process. The government of S. Demirel, which came to power in November 1979, announced on January 24, 1980, the stabili-

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registration program. After the military came to power in September 1980, Turkey continued to consistently implement the Program of January 24, 1980. Its main provisions were aimed, on the one hand, at strengthening the country's internal economic situation by reducing government spending and limiting the money supply, and on the other hand, at improving the country's currency situation, but no longer by limiting all possible expenditures, including import ones, but by actively increasing foreign exchange earnings by increasing the volume of exports of goods and services. services.

Parliamentary elections were held in Turkey in late 1983. A civilian government led by Turgut Ozal, formed by the Fatherland Party (PA), came to power in the country. Ozal planned a deep structural restructuring of the Turkish economy, the meaning of which was to give it international competitiveness through the use of market mechanisms and promote Turkish products to foreign markets.

Turgut Ozal was fully aware that the success of the planned structural reforms depended to a decisive extent not so much on the concentration of power in the hands of the state as a whole, but rather on the combination of decisive economic powers in his own hands: he largely put the use of public finances under his personal control, strictly adhered to the policy of reducing real wages restrictions on all possible forms of discontent with workers. "Ozal, while defending liberalism in the economy, continued to adhere to an authoritarian concept in politics," they wrote about him in Turkey (see, for example, [Akar, 2001, p. 216]). Of course, such an approach threatened the popularity of economic policies, which by the 1980s had become an indispensable condition for political longevity in Turkey. But Ozal managed to cope with the situation by successfully using the skill of balancing between interest groups. But both structural economic transformations and measures to serve the private interests of individual electoral groups required additional expenditures. As a result, having significantly transformed the sectoral and institutional structure of the Turkish economy and achieved a significant increase in exports of finished products, Ozal was not able to solve the problem of inflation. In search of sources of financing the deficit of state finances, the government was forced to resort to a significant increase in the money supply. Despite the proclamation of the "hard money policy", the volume of issues increased by more than 65% per year from 1983 to 1989 [Kavrakoglu, 1997, p. 39]. As a result, the average annual inflation rate in 1984-1987 was 43%. "Since we have implemented a transformation that requires 100 years in 10 years, we have not been able to keep inflation under control. This is the state of affairs," Turgut Ozal himself summed up the results of his activities as Prime Minister [Akar, 2001, p. 214].

Nevertheless, Ozal's uniqueness as a prime minister and author of economic policy was that he managed to combine the inevitable submission to the populist tradition with extremely relevant modernization measures for the economy.

In late 1989, Turgut Ozal became President of the Republic of Turkey. And it is probably no coincidence that his departure from the post of prime Minister coincided with a change in the very style of economic policy: the former prime minister's virtuoso compromise art, which combined populist concessions with a strategic course for structural adjustment of the economy, was replaced by the unconditional and dangerous economic populism of the late 1980s and early 1990s. The new prime ministers, who were inferior in political sophistication to Ozal, responded to the aggravation of contradictions between society and the authorities only with erroneous concessions from the point of view of long-term economic strategy, which they were forced to make by the restoration of democracy, which was more complete than the period of Ozal's premiership, including those represented by strong trade unions.

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The increase in real wages led to a decline in the competitiveness of the Turkish economy, the process of modernization slowed down, and dangerous imbalances were revealed in the financial sector: the budget deficit, which was 3% of GDP in 1990, reached 16.5% of GDP by 2001, the minimum growth rate of the M1 money supply was 35% (2001), and the maximum 110% (1996), the lowest level of average annual price growth in the 1990s-early 2000s was 45% (2000), and the highest - 119% (1994) [Ekonomik Report 1994, p. 45; Ekonomik Rapor 2001, p. 76]. As a result, Turkey has repeatedly experienced financial and economic crises, in particular in 1994 and 2001.

Among the decisions taken after the 1994 crisis aimed at improving the stability of the economy, the decision to transform the Central Bank of Russia into a more autonomous structure responsible for conducting an effective monetary policy should be highlighted. As a result, on April 21, 1994, the Central Bank Act of 1970 was amended to reduce the amount of CBTR advances to the Treasury. After 1998, it was supposed to completely abandon the use of Central Bank loans.

Since the late 1990s, cabinet leaders have shown a more or less consistent commitment to stabilization measures. Thus, the Turkish magazine Para, with reference to the English "The Economist", wrote about the prime minister of the government who came to power in the country in July 1997: "M. Yilmaz's popularity is so low that the only way for him to win the next election is to really reduce inflation" [Para, 5 - 11.07.1998].

After the financial and economic crisis of 2001, a new law on the Central Bank was adopted. It does not provide for the provision of loans to the Treasury or other government agencies and organizations by the CBTR. Can we say that the change in the nature of relations between the Central Bank and the executive branch meant that the populist economic tradition in Turkey was put to an end? The further development of events rather suggests that the process of getting rid of this tradition will be much longer and more complex than the process of taking root.

In 2002, the pro-Islamic Justice and Development Party came to power in the country. Its policy promises potentially threatened a resurgence of populist tendencies in Turkey's economic policy. But both the pragmatism of the new leaders and the restrictions imposed by Turkey's loan cooperation commitments with the IMF led to a compromise between the party's election promises in the social sphere and the Fund's demands for strict compliance with strict fiscal discipline. As a result, Turkey entered a period of economic stabilization: the budget deficit in 2007 was 1.6% of GDP, which was the highest value in the last 3 years: in 2005-2006. it fluctuated within 1%. The government debt-to-GDP ratio decreased from 80% in 2002 to 39% in 2007. The growth rate of the M1 monetary aggregate, declining quite steadily, was 7.3% in 2008 against 51.2% in 2003 (the maximum value for the period). The average annual rate of inflation calculated on the basis of consumer prices decreased over the same period from 45% to 9% [Ekonomik Rapor 2005, s. 66, Ekonomik Rapor 2007, s. 70, Ekonomik Rapor 2008, s. 90].

The currency and financial crisis that began in 2008 has once again tested Turkey's resistance to using populist policies as a basis for economic policy. The fact is that the deterioration of the economic situation during the crisis made it urgent for Turkey to conclude a new loan agreement with the IMF. A preliminary condition is to tighten the balance in the sphere of state finances, which was violated during the preparation and conduct of municipal elections held in the country.

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in March 2009 But, according to Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan, in conditions when the unemployment rate in the country has exceeded 16% and the investment process needs to be maintained in order to create jobs, proposals to curb economic growth and increase government revenues cannot be considered. As a result, there was a stalemate in Turkey's negotiations with the IMF: the Fund, as a condition for allocating funds, requires resolving the situation in the field of public finances, for which the government needs the Fund's funds during the crisis.

Thus, the adoption of 1950 as a watershed point in the economic history of the Republic of Turkey does not eliminate the possibility of dividing the second half of the XX - beginning of the XXI century into separate sub-periods, based on, for example, the degree or specific forms of manifestation of economic populism (directions of using public spending).

What are the approaches to the periodization of the economic history of the republic in Turkish literature, or rather to the choice of a periodization criterion? A large number of local economists to one degree or another share the approach noted above as the main one in domestic Turkology, i.e. they use the ratio of the role of the state and private entrepreneurship as a criterion for periodization. Nevertheless, it is relatively rare for authors to consider the 1950s as part of the "mixed economy"period. As a rule, the 1950s are considered as a separate period with its own characteristics, the main one of which is an attempt to escape from the rigid statistic model. Most of the authors agree that this feature has not been fully manifested. However, the main focus of the estimates is on the attempts made to update the economic model. For example, according to N. Kuyucuklu, the period of the 1950s declared itself as a time of liberal changes that were not destined to be realized [Kuyucuklu, 1993,p. 196]. K. Gazgan characterizes the 1950s as a period of "openness to foreign capital and attempts to transition to a market economy" [Kazgan, 1993, p. 196]. 2002, p. 82].

But in the Turkish literature, when identifying periods in the country's economic development, an approach based on a change in the nature of state fiscal and monetary policy is also reflected to a certain extent. Thus, I. Parasyz in his work" The Turkish Economy " called the chapter devoted to the 1950s "The period of turning to a market economy, during which Keynesian expansionist policy of expanding demand and inflationary growth was carried out." Parasyz writes: "The change in power that took place in 1950 was the reason for the commitment to the strategy of economic growth at any cost" [Parasiz, 2003, p. 109]. Thus, the author focuses on the attempt to accelerate economic growth and the mechanisms used for this purpose, namely, the fiscal and monetary policies of the authorities: "The government that came to power in 1950, pursuing a policy of economic growth by all means, primarily aimed at increasing the purchasing power of the rural population that brought it to power. It also sought to expand and strengthen the private sector. The most important tool for achieving these goals was the Central Bank's funds, and the consequence of its use is inflation "[Parasiz, 2003, p. 153].

About 1950 as the beginning of a new period in the history of Turkey, including the economic one, says Ch. Keider: "The 1950 elections marked a turning point in Turkish history... After the decision was made in 1946 to create a multi-party Mejlis, grant universal voting rights and turn politics to the electorate, unanimity in power was put to an end... Members of the Mejlis... they began to speak to the voters with assurances that only they can represent the will of the people. Thus, the practice of using populist statements has been established in politics "[Keyder, 2001, p. 163].

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The origin and development of the populist economic tradition is traced in the work of K. Boratava "Economic History of Turkey, 1908-2002". He writes: "1946 was a turning point in the history of republican Turkey, both politically and economically... Under the parliamentary regime, the broad masses of the people are no longer a spectator, they become an actor on the stage where society is developing. From this point on, the government is forced to take into account the economic and social interests of the broad strata of the people - workers, peasants, artisans, and others - at least from election to election, and to satisfy them in one form or another. This necessity leads to the fact that in the sphere of economic policy and distribution relations, some decisions are made that may contradict the short-term interests of the propertied classes. So that the current situation, the important content of which is becoming a populist regime (my italics - N. U.It is necessary to prevent direct representatives of the people or the left-wing opposition from coming to power as an alternative. So it was in Turkey" [Boratav, 2003, p. 95].

"One of the main features of the period 1962-1976," Boratav writes further, " was the political regime's commitment to a distributional policy, which can be described as populist (emphasis added).) ... As a result, a balance emerged between the long-term interests of the ruling bloc and the short-term interests of the broad masses of the people" [Boratav, 2003, p. 123]. Curiously, Boratav sees the import substitution strategy that Turkey followed during this period as a "product" of the aforementioned balance of interests. He writes: "Import substitution provided for the expansion and revival of the domestic market, under this model, wages, being an element of costs for an individual entrepreneur, at the same time were a component of demand, which provided support for the production process. As a result, there was no need to put pressure on wages by political means, as required by the export-oriented model of industrialization. The system of public bargaining, which included the right to strike and the wide spread of trade unions, ensured "sustainable growth of real incomes of the working class" [Boratav, 2003, p. 123-124].

The transition to an export-oriented growth strategy in the early 1980s required a change in wage policy. But, adhering to the tactics in the field of remuneration, which, it would seem, did not leave any chances for supporting employees, Prime Minister Turgut Ozal managed to find some mechanisms for reaching a compromise. K. Boratav noted that the period of Ozal's rule was the years when the policy of "one-sided" populism was carried out against the masses. This policy was primarily aimed at the urban poor. Its essence was that rural migrants who spontaneously built gejekonda (primitive housing), which was previously considered illegal buildings, were granted the right to own real estate, or legal amnesties were held in their interests for the housing that actually appeared, or construction permits were issued that were not provided for in urban development plans. The goal of this policy, according to Boratav, was to deprive this mass of residents of their own class consciousness and create a large group of them to support the program and ideology of capital (Boratav, 2003, p. 153). "In Turkey, the most effective form of bringing workers to the political scene was 'parliamentary populism', which followed the first 25 years of the republic - the years of reformist and authoritarian paternalism," Boratav sums up [2003, p. 216].

The continuation of the populist tradition in economic policy already in the 1980s. Onish. He wrote: "It would be an oversimplification to characterize the reforms of the 1980s as a transition from one extreme - the over-regulated and controlled 'mixed' economy-to another-the neoliberal economy

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"free market". Despite significant achievements in the area of liberalization, there were still significant elements of State control " [Onis, 1996, p. 163]. Under the Z control elements. Onish is more likely referring to elements of government intervention in the economy, such as export subsidies. As a result, "large-scale micro-level interventionism continued to be characteristic of the Turkish economy, albeit in new forms, using new tools... In a situation where democracy is the main goal and when the level of inequality in the distribution of income reaches an extremely high level, the state cannot isolate itself from the process of redistribution and focus on long-term goals related to increasing productivity and savings, " Z. sums up. Onis (1996, p. 171).

Deepening of macroeconomic instability in the Turkish economy after 1987 Onish sees it as a result of increased pressure to redistribute national income, a pressure that was previously artificially contained due to the restrictive nature of the political regime. He explains the active implementation of an expansionary fiscal policy by the fact that, in the end, it was possible to satisfy the demands in the sphere of consumption of electoral groups of the new parties in power - employees, agricultural producers, and the bourgeoisie focused on the domestic market.

Thus, the persistence of the problem of the state budget deficit in the context of the liberalization of the Turkish economy, which also included the privatization process, indicates at least that there are additional reasons for problems in the field of public finances in addition to expanding and maintaining the conditions for the functioning of state property.

The acceptance of 1950 as a watershed point is combined with a fairly free selection by local authors of periods in the development of Turkey in the second half of the XX century-the beginning of the XXI century, based on, for example, the level of inflation, the dates of adoption of the next stabilization programs, the features of the interaction of the national economy with the world financial market, organically and inextricably linked to the fundamental changes of the mid-twentieth century.

Thus, the experience of the Republic of Turkey is an example of the specific use of institutions of political and economic life borrowed from the West. If the peculiarity of their interpretation in the countries of South-East Asia allows us to assume the existence of an" authoritarian-market model of development "[Volkov, 2003, p.261], then the experience of Turkey points to a"populist market model". Its implementation included, along with, and often at odds with, global catch-up development goals, short-term goals of ensuring the viability of Governments by reaching a deal with voters through populist concessions.

Thus, the definition of the general specifics of the historical development of Turkey as "comprehensive state participation in almost all spheres of life-ideological, political, social, economic" gets a new dimension in the economic sphere, which does not lose its relevance as the scale of state ownership decreases.

The "alternative" periodization of the economic history of the Republic of Turkey, which is essentially based on a new political economy - the theory of public choice, which studies the political mechanisms of the formation of macroeconomic decisions under the pressure of the democratic system, provides a number of additional research opportunities. First, it allows us to make more detailed forecasts of the country's economic development, without limiting the target horizons of the national elite in the economic sphere to changes in the ratio of forms of social development.-

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state-owned enterprises. Secondly, the theory of public choice also reveals the most effective ways to overcome contradictions in the country's economic development by specifying, in relation to the conditions of Turkey, the general theoretical position on the need to develop a system of restrictions for the economic intervention of a state operating on democratic principles.2
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2 The law that changed the status of the CBTR can obviously be considered one of the first in a series of such restrictions. But it is important to assess its effectiveness in the context of Turkey's economic development at the beginning of the XXI century.

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